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Teachers and Schools Under Attack in Africa

El Africa Research Report



Tali Klein
April 2026



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Foreword

Across the African Region, teachers, education support personnel (ESP), and students are increasingly forced to teach and learn in environments characterised by fear, insecurity, and violence. For many teachers and ESP, the school, which is intended to be a protected public space, has become a setting of risk. Attacks on teachers and schools are not isolated security incidents; they represent a direct attack on the right to education, on decent working conditions for educators, and on the sustainability of public education systems.

This report on EI Africa's research on *Teachers and Schools Under Attack in Africa*, is firmly pinned to Education International's constitutional provisions, policy papers, and resolutions on protecting teachers, defending education as a public good, and advancing social dialogue and democratic governance in education. It also supports EI's 'Go Public! Fund Education' campaign, which aims to help achieve safeguard public education systems adequately financed and staffed, including in contexts of crisis, conflict, and fragility.

At the Africa regional level, the findings of this research speak directly to the priorities of the African Union's Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2026–2035, which recognises safe, inclusive, and resilient education systems as foundational to Africa's development, peace, and social cohesion. CESA 26–35 places strong emphasis on teacher professionalism, system resilience, equity, and protection of learners and education personnel, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Attacks on teachers and schools fundamentally undermine these objectives and threaten the attainment of CESA's transformational goals.

Drawing on the experiences of 358 teachers and education support personnel across at least 19 countries, complemented by in-depth case studies from four countries, namely, Nigeria, South Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, this report places teachers and their unions at the centre of evidence generation and policy analysis, in line with EI and AU commitments to inclusive, participatory education governance. It documents a wide range of violations, including threats, intimidation, looting, military occupation of schools, abductions, and killings, and demonstrates how these attacks trigger wider systemic harm, including school closures, displacement,

trauma, rising dropout rates, and the erosion of the teaching profession.

A key finding of this research is the persistence of a great accountability gap. While governments have endorsed instruments such as the Safe Schools Declaration, the African Union's Safe Schools Framework, and the United Nations' Security Council Resolution 2601 on protecting education and children in situations of armed conflict, the evidence shows that these commitments too often fail to translate into concrete protection at school level. Frontline teachers frequently lack safe reporting mechanisms, and reported incidents are rarely followed by investigation, protection, or justice. This gap directly contradicts both EI resolutions and the CESA 2026–2035 commitments to accountable governance, system effectiveness, and protection of education in emergencies.

This reality is incompatible with quality education and with the achievement of SDG 4 and CESA objectives. As EI has consistently emphasised, “there can be no quality, equitable, and inclusive education without protected, supported, and professionally secure teachers.” The findings further expose the largely invisible psychosocial burden, the “silent trauma” of teachers, which remains insufficiently addressed in education and humanitarian responses, despite clear calls within both EI policy frameworks and CESA 26–35 for teacher wellbeing, professional dignity, and workforce sustainability.

The report also clearly points to solutions that align with EI priorities and AU continental education strategies. Teachers and unions consistently call for increased public investment in education; effective operationalisation of existing protection frameworks; safe and dignified school infrastructure; functioning reporting and accountability systems; and the institutionalised involvement of teacher unions through meaningful social dialogue. These demands reflect not only EI's policy positions, but also the AU CESA's emphasis on inclusive partnerships, resilient systems, and evidence-based decision-making.

This report is therefore not only a research contribution, but a strategic tool for union-led advocacy, supporting the call to governments, the African Union, and international partners to translate continental and global commitments into concrete protection for teachers and schools. Progress toward CESA 2026–2035 will not be possible if teachers continue to work under threat.

Education International Africa presents this report with the conviction that defending education as a public good begins with defending those who deliver it. Protecting teachers and schools is not optional; it is essential to achieving the aspirations of SDG 4, CESA 2026–2035, and Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.

Dennis Sinyolo

Regional Director,

Education International Africa

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
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Executive Summary

Across Africa, teachers, education support personnel (ESP), and students are increasingly exposed to violence, intimidation, abduction, and attacks on schools. For many, going to school has become a daily risk rather than a guaranteed right.

This report presents teacher-centred evidence on attacks against education, drawing on data from 358 respondents across at least 19 countries, complemented by Key Informant Interviews (KIs) in Nigeria, South Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

It responds to a critical gap in existing research: the limited inclusion of teachers' lived experiences in policy and protection discussions.



Despite the existence of international and regional frameworks—including the Safe Schools Declaration, the African Union Safe Schools Framework, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601 on protecting education and children in situations of armed conflict—there remains a persistent gap between policy commitments and implementation at the school level. Across both survey data and country case studies, teachers describe environments where insecurity has become normalised, ranging from threats and intimidation to abductions,

looting, and the occupation of schools. As one respondent noted, *“Security organs are only a few kilometres away, yet we remain exposed.”*

A central finding of the study is the existence of a critical accountability gap. **While awareness of protection frameworks may exist at national or union leadership levels, frontline teachers frequently lack access to clear reporting mechanisms, and even when incidents are reported, they are rarely followed by meaningful institutional response.** This disconnect between policy and practice reinforces a broader perception that commitments remain symbolic rather than operational.

The impacts of attacks on education are severe and systemic. They extend far beyond individual incidents to include school closures, disruption of learning, displacement of teachers and students, increased absenteeism, and rising dropout rates—particularly among girls. These effects contribute to the gradual destabilization of education systems, compounding existing fragilities in conflict-affected contexts.

At the same time, teachers are playing an essential but under-recognised role as frontline responders. They are expected to maintain learning continuity, support traumatised students, and uphold a sense of normalcy in highly unstable environments, often without adequate training, protection, or institutional support. As one respondent stated, *“Teachers are left alone to manage crises without protection or support.”* The psychosocial toll of this role is significant, yet mental health and support systems remain largely underdeveloped.

Importantly, the findings also point to clear, actionable priorities. Teachers and their unions consistently advocate for a combination of strengthened physical protection measures, improved reporting and accountability systems, greater investment in psychosocial support, and enhanced community engagement. These priorities align closely with the Comprehensive School Safety Framework, underscoring the need for integrated approaches that go beyond isolated or reactive interventions.

Teacher unions emerge throughout the study as critical actors in both responding to and documenting attacks, often filling gaps left by state systems. However, their ability to operate effectively is frequently constrained by limited resources, political pressure, and restricted space for engagement.

Overall, the findings of this report point to a clear and urgent conclusion: the challenge is not the absence of frameworks, but the failure to implement them effectively. There is strong alignment between international commitments, teacher-identified priorities, and established good practices. What is missing is coordinated, adequately resourced, and accountable action at the level where protection matters most—the school.

Protecting teachers and schools is not only a matter of safety; it is essential to ensuring the continuity, quality, and future of education systems across the region. As one respondent emphasised, *“Peace and protection of schools must be everyone’s responsibility.”*

1. Introduction

Attacks on education are not limited to isolated acts of violence, but encompass a broad range of actions that undermine the safety, dignity, and professional integrity of teachers and learners. In this report, “attacks” refer to physical violence such as assaults, killings, kidnappings or abductions, and the destruction of schools or teachers' homes; threats including intimidation, death threats, and forced school closures; harassment and psychological abuse; attacks in conflict settings; and institutional or structural actions such as arbitrary detention, unpaid salaries as punishment, or sanctions against teachers for union activity or speaking out.

“Safety” in education is, therefore, understood not only as protection from physical harm, but also as the ability of teachers and learners to operate in environments free from fear, coercion, and professional insecurity.

These attacks have far-reaching consequences. They restrict access to education through school closures and displacement, undermine the quality and continuity of learning, and erode the teaching profession by creating conditions of fear, instability, and attrition.

Despite the existence of international and regional frameworks, including the Safe Schools Declaration, the African Union Safe Schools Framework, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601, there remains a critical gap between policy commitments and the lived realities of those on the frontlines of education. While these frameworks establish clear obligations for the protection of education, their implementation at school level remains uneven, under-resourced, and often ineffective.

Global evidence shows that attacks on education remain persistent and, in recent years, have intensified. The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) reported more than 11,000 separate attacks on education facilities, students, and educators globally between 2015 and 2019; over 5,000 reported attacks on education and cases of military use in 2020 and 2021; and around 6,000 such incidents in 2022 and 2023 alone, harming more than 10,000 students and educators. Several African countries examined in this report—including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mozambique, and South Sudan—remain among those significantly affected.

At the same time, the experiences and perspectives of teachers — often the first line of response and student protection — and their unions, those most directly affected—remain insufficiently documented and underrepresented in policy discussions. This lack of teacher-centred evidence limits the ability of governments, regional bodies, and international actors to design responses that are both relevant and effective.

This study addresses that gap by generating first-hand, union-led evidence on attacks against teachers and schools across Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on data from 358 survey respondents across at least 19 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, complemented by Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) in Nigeria, South Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the research provides both regional breadth and contextual depth.

The study adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative analysis of incident patterns with qualitative insights into the lived experiences, coping strategies, and priorities of teachers and their representative organisations. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding not only of the scale and nature of attacks, but also of their impacts on safety, wellbeing, and educational continuity, as well as the systemic gaps that allow such attacks to persist.

Importantly, this research is both analytical and advocacy-oriented. It seeks not only to document evidence of attacks, but to translate that evidence into actionable insights that support governments, teacher unions, and international partners in strengthening the protection of education

The findings presented in this report highlight a consistent and urgent reality: while policy frameworks exist, they are not yet effectively operationalised at the level where protection matters most—the school. Bridging this gap requires a shift from commitments on paper to concrete, coordinated action that prioritises the safety, dignity, and professional security of teachers and learners alike.

2. Purpose of the Research

The primary purpose of this research is to amplify the perspectives of teachers and unions to inform advocacy and policy change. The study's specific objectives are:

- Documenting the scale and forms of attacks on education.

- Analysing the gap between existing policy (like the SSD) and frontline practice.
- Strengthening the advocacy capacity of teacher unions through robust data.
- Generating action-oriented recommendations for global and regional stakeholders.

Analysis Objective & Scope

The core mission of this report is to synthesise the primary actions for improving educational safety as identified by a representative cohort of 358 respondents across English, French, and Portuguese-speaking contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. This qualitative synthesis is derived from Question 18 of the "Conflict and Armed Attacks on Teachers and Schools Study," which prompted participants to articulate 1–3 priority interventions to protect teachers, education support personnel (ESP), and students.

1. Research Purpose and Analysis Objectives

This data analysis plan is designed to bridge the critical gap between teacher-centred evidence and the policy implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD). Despite international frameworks—including UN Security Council Resolution 2601 and the African Union Safe Schools Framework—the specific experiences of teachers and the strategic resilience of their unions remain under-documented. This analysis seeks to generate technical, action-oriented evidence to operationalise the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use and hold signatory states accountable.

The analysis is guided by four specific objectives:

- (1) Documenting scale, drivers, and impact: Identifying the frequency and types of attacks—including Sexual Violence Related to Conflict (SVAC)—and the underlying security dynamics and psychosocial consequences for education workers.
- (2) Analysing policy gaps: Evaluating the alignment between national legislation and international commitments (SSD, UN Res 2601) to identify

specific implementation failures.

- (3) Amplifying teacher and union voices: Ensuring that policy recommendations are grounded in stakeholder-disaggregated data that captures the distinct perspectives of frontline teachers versus union leadership.
- (4) Supporting evidence-based advocacy: Providing robust descriptive and qualitative data to strengthen the capacity of unions to influence the African Union, UN Security Council monitoring, and national policy forums.

The findings are structured to provide actionable evidence for three key stakeholder groups:

- Governments: To prioritise infrastructure investment and legislative enforcement.
- Teacher Unions: To strengthen advocacy, documentation, and member-protection frameworks.
- International Partners: To align donor funding with localized psychosocial and monitoring needs.


3. Methodology

The study employed a mixed-methods approach combining desk review, quantitative survey data, and qualitative group discussions.

Overview:

- Data Collection: A cross-sectional online survey was administered in English, French, and Portuguese to ensure broad regional reach and representation. Key Informant Interviews were conducted virtually with union leaders and frontline educators from the five focus countries.
- Ethical Considerations: All data was scrubbed of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to ensure respondent anonymity and confidentiality, in accordance with conflict-sensitive research standards.

- Analysis Plan: Quantitative: Raw survey data (CSV format)



(<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/11p8miNZmGTArVsifWCUnOJtvRKUQuFq2jv8z6ZPGI9c/edit?resourcekey=&gid=20193084#gid=20193084>) underwent descriptive analysis to identify prevalence and patterns of attacks across 19 countries. This data supports the study's objective of providing "regional breadth and contextual depth" across Sub-Saharan Africa. While this report formally identifies 19 countries as the core representative group, this raw data highlights participation from at least 22 distinct categories, demonstrating the wide reach of the union-led survey. This regional variety is further deepened by the five focus countries chosen for Key Informant Interviews: Nigeria, DRC, Mozambique, South Sudan, and Cameroon, which provided the qualitative evidence on the "accountability gap" and "silent trauma" experienced by educators.

- Qualitative: Open-ended survey responses (specifically Q18) and KII transcripts were analysed using inductive thematic coding to identify emergent priorities and resilience strategies.

3.1 Study Design

The study employed a mixed-methods, dual-stream data approach to capture both regional breadth and contextual depth across five priority countries: Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan.

3.2 Data Collection


Data Source Overview

Data Stream	Target Respondents
Quantitative Analysis (18-question multilingual survey)	Teachers, Education Support Personnel (ESPs), School Leaders, and Local Union Representatives.
Qualitative Analysis (KIIs and Case Studies)	Union Leaders, Ministry of Education Officials, Faith Leaders, CBO/CSO Representatives, and Humanitarian Partners.


The survey captured a diverse respondent profile across roles, gender, age, and geographic context, as illustrated in **Figure 1**.

Figure 1. Profile of survey respondents by role, gender, age band, and location (n=358)


Q2. Role / Fonction / Função (Select one/ Sélectionnez-en un/ Seleccione um)
348 response




Q3. Gender / Genre / Gênero
348 responses



Q4. Age band / Tranche d'âge / Faixa etária
348 responses



Q7. Location / Lieu / Local 348 responses



3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1. Quantitative Analysis Framework (Survey Data)

The quantitative stream utilised descriptive and cross-sectional analysis to identify prevalence and patterns. Data will be processed using frequencies, percentages, and intentional cross-tabulations.

1. Demographic and Disability Segmentation: Analysis of Section A (Q1–Q10) established respondent profiles. Cross-tabulations were performed to assess if specific vulnerabilities existed based on Role (Teacher vs. ESP), Gender (identifying disproportionate targeting of female teachers), and Location (Urban, Rural, or IDP/Refugee camps). Specific attention was paid to the intersection of conflict and disability status (Q9–Q10).
2. Incident, SVAC, and Impact Analysis: Section B (Q11–Q13) was analysed to determine the prevalence of specific attack types, including school damage, abductions, and Sexual Violence Related to Conflict (SVAC). Frequency analysis was used to measure the intensity of conflict (e.g., "Monthly or more" vs. "Once").
3. Policy Awareness and Reporting Benchmarking: Section C (Q14–Q17) measured awareness levels of the SSD, the AU Safe Schools Framework,

and EI resolutions. Analysis was used to evaluate the functionality of reporting mechanisms and whether reports are typically "acted upon," providing a metric for state accountability.

3.3.2. Qualitative Analysis Framework (KIIs and Open-Ended Responses)

Inductive Coding Methodology

This analysis employed an inductive thematic coding approach, ensuring that categories emerged directly from the "Source Context" of the survey responses rather than being imposed through a pre-existing lens. This methodology captures the authentic "voice" of frontline education workers.

Qualitative data from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and open-ended survey responses (Q18) underwent thematic coding to identify emergent patterns and context-specific resilience strategies.

- Cross-Lingual Synthesis: Responses in English, French, and Portuguese were synthesised into a unified thematic framework to identify shared regional challenges while preserving unique national security nuances.
- Stakeholder-Disaggregated Inductive Coding: To avoid simplistic generalisations, the coding protocol explicitly differentiated between the views of different stakeholder groups (e.g., the policy-level focus of Union Leaders vs. the safety-level focus of frontline Teachers).
- AI Integration and RAG Protocol: Initial theme extraction was supported by Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) using tools like NotebookLM. This ensures the model only analyses uploaded data and does not "hallucinate" external information. To mitigate risks of the AI "wildly overestimating significance" or producing "hyperbolic generalisations" lacking contextual grounding, a 10% manual back-check of all AI-generated themes against raw transcripts is mandatory.

3.3.3. Data Rigor and AI Integration

To manage the volume of multilingual data (EN, FR, PT), the research team utilised NotebookLM, leveraging a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)

approach. This ensured that the AI only utilised the provided dataset, maintaining high levels of data privacy and factual grounding.

To satisfy the standards of qualitative rigor required for policy-level reporting, the following steps were taken:

1. **Data Cleaning:** All Personally Identifiable Information (PII) was scrubbed to maintain respondent anonymity and ethical safety.
2. **Traceability:** The RAG approach allowed the researcher to trace every emergent theme back to specific respondent timestamps and quotes.
3. **Manual Verification:** In accordance with industry best practices, a 10% target for manual back-checking was strictly enforced. The qualitative researcher cross-referenced AI-generated themes against the raw data to correct for "hyperbolic extrapolation" and to ensure the nuance of stakeholder views was preserved.

3.3.4. Ethical and Security Requirement

All qualitative data underwent rigorous scrubbing of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). All data was scrubbed of any names or personal information prior to being run through an AI platform that employed the collection and triangulation of the data.

3.4. Limitations

The analysis prioritised rigor through traceable citations facilitated by the RAG approach, ensuring every finding is linked to specific respondent data.


Key Limitations

- **Sampling Bias:** Participation is restricted by union reach and internet connectivity.
- **Self-Reporting Risks:** Potential for recall bias or under-reporting due to trauma or security fears.

- Geographic Concentration: Data may be more robust in accessible zones (e.g., Northeast Nigeria) compared to active frontlines.
- Language and Access Constraints: Security-related movement restrictions may limit the number of KIs in specific Sahelian regions.

4. Findings

General Context: By the Numbers



- **General Africa Trend:** Estimates suggest the number of conflicts in Africa surged from 34 in 1989 to 104 in 2022, driven primarily by non-state conflict. This underscores why respondents see insecurity as "normalised." (44940-doc-AU_CESA-2026-2035_Strategy_ENG)
- **Nigeria (Focus Country):** In 2023 alone, Save the Children identified 89 incidents in Nigeria, the highest among AU countries. Over the years of the insurgency, teacher unions document that at least 600 teachers were killed in the Northeast region (see Annex 1)
- **DRC (Case Study):** In North Kivu, rebel activity led to the closure of 1,900 schools between December 2025 and February 2026.
- **South Sudan (Case Study):** Approximately 76% of the population is currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Historical records show over 1,000 documented attacks on education in earlier conflict periods.
- **Displacement linked to attacks on education:** More than 4.4 million school-age children (5–14) in Sub-Saharan Africa are at risk of having their education affected by internal displacement, and at least 3 million displaced children risk being out of school due to lack of educational support. (More than 4.4 million children of primary and lower secondary age (5–14) are at risk of having their education affected by internal displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to UNESCO/IDMC's background paper for the Global Education Monitoring Report.)¹
- As of 2022, Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA had the highest numbers of internally displaced persons globally, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan among the top IDP countries; the UN notes that crises in these contexts have severely disrupted education systems through school closure, population displacement, and destruction of infrastructure²

In countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and South Sudan, displacement continues to significantly disrupt access to education and the functioning of school systems.


¹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impacts-internal-displacement-education-sub-saharan-africa>

² https://www.un.org/osaa/sites/www.un.org.osaa/files/files/documents/2024/publications/ads2024_policybrief3.pdf

4.1. Quantitative Patterns (Survey Metrics)

- Respondent Profile: The 358 participants represent a diverse range of roles, including
- national/regional union leaders, classroom teachers, and school leaders.

Q2. Role / Fonction / Função (Select one/ Sélectionnez-en un/ Seleccione um)
348 response




(see Q3- gender, Q4- age, Q7-location, in Section 3.2)

Figure 2 summarises the socio-demographic profile of respondents, showing variation in roles, gender, age bands, institution types, disability status, and geographic context


Figure 2. Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents and their teaching contexts (n=358).

Q8. Learners with disabilities in you class/school? / Élèves en situation de handicap? / Alunos com deficiência?


348 response



Q9.Disability status (respondent) / Handicap (répondant·e) / Deficiência (respondente)
348 responses



Q10.Learners with disabilities in your class/school? / Élèves en situation de handicap?
Alunos com deficiência
348 responses




- Nature of Attacks:** The most commonly reported forms of attacks include threats and intimidation, looting and destruction of school property, physical assaults, kidnappings and abductions, and, in a limited number of cases, killings. While killings were not among the most frequently reported incidents, their presence in the data highlights the severity of risks faced by teachers in certain contexts.

Figure 3. Types of incidents experienced or witnessed by respondents.

Q11. Incidents experienced or witnessed / Incident vécus ou observés / Incidentes vivenciados ou testemunhados (Select all that apply/ sélectionnez... ce qui s'applique/seleccione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses



As shown in Figures 4 and 5, attacks are not isolated incidents but occur repeatedly, with significant immediate impacts including school closures, displacement, and trauma

Figure 4. Frequency of attacks reported in respondents' contexts.

Q12. Frequency at your school/educational institution/community EN: How often have these occurred, per year? FR: Fréquence dans votre école... na sua escola/instituição/comunidade, por ano

348 responses





Figure 5. Immediate impacts observed following attacks on education.

Q13. Immediate impacts observed / Impacts immédiats observés / Impactos imediatos observados (Select all that apply / sélectionnez tout ce qui s'applique/ seleccione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses



The Accountability Gap: While awareness of the SSD is high among national leadership, 60% of frontline

teachers reported being "not sure" or having no mechanism to report threats [96, 1003, Survey Results]. Even when reports are made, they are "rarely" or only "sometimes" followed by institutional action [97, 1005, Survey Results].


4.1.1. Quantitative Synthesis of Priority Themes

Figure 6 illustrates the protection measures currently in place, while Table 2 highlights priority areas for strengthening safety.

Figure 6. Protection measures currently in place at school or community level.

Q14. Protection measures currently in place / Mesures de protection actuellement en place / Medidas de proteção atualmente em vigor (Selecione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses



The following **table (2)** quantifies the most frequently cited thematic priorities for school and teacher safety across the 358-respondent sample

Thematic Category	Frequency Score (%)	Description of Respondent Requests
Physical Security & Infrastructure	48%	Mandatory fencing, perimeter walls, 24-hour guards, and controlled entry points.
Policy Enforcement & Legal	22%	Implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) and enactment of national laws protecting teachers.
Capacity Building & Awareness	18%	Community sensitization, awareness campaigns, and training in emergency response/first aid.
Psychosocial & Institutional Support	8%	Hiring school psychologists and providing mental health resources for traumatized staff and students.
Reporting & Accountability	4%	Establishing anonymous reporting mechanisms and ensuring legal action against perpetrators.

Thematic Deep Dive: Physical and Environmental Security

Respondents identified the "physical hardening" of school sites as the single most urgent priority. Many noted that current educational environments are entirely porous, making them easy targets for abduction, looting, and intimidation.

- **Perimeter Security:** There is a nearly universal demand for the installation of perimeter walls and secure fencing to define school boundaries and deter unauthorised entry.
- **Active Personnel Protection:** Beyond passive barriers, respondents emphasised the need for a visible security presence, including the deployment of gendarmerie/police patrols and the hiring of 24-hour security guards.
- **Surveillance Infrastructure:** The integration of alarms and cameras was frequently mentioned as a necessary tool for both prevention and evidence collection.

Illustrative Quotes:

- *"Sécurisation du périmètre par une clôture et présence permanente d'agents de sécurité."* (Burundi) (translation: *Securing the perimeter with a fence and the permanent presence of security guards*)
- *"Securing the school compound through perimeter wall and security guards."* (Kenya)
- *"Provision of security personnel at school for 24 hours."* (South Africa)

4.2. Qualitative Context (KII & Open-Ended Insights)

Across Q18 and the final open-ended responses, teachers and education personnel repeatedly emphasised that school safety requires more than isolated security measures. Their responses point to seven recurring priorities: physical protection, security-sector accountability, reporting and follow-up, psychosocial support, legal protection, community participation, and improved teacher conditions. These provide important qualitative depth to the quantitative findings.

A clear pattern emerges: respondents are asking not only for protection after attacks occur, but for systems that prevent attacks, respond quickly when incidents happen, and support teachers and learners afterwards. Many responses also highlight the need for stronger trust between schools, unions, communities, police, ministries of education, and local authorities.

- "The school compound should be fenced. Government should provide security intelligence in advance to schools."
- "Reports should be acted promptly... justice delayed is justice denied."
- "Teachers must be listened to."
- "There is an urgent need for overhauling reporting policies, improving transparency, and prioritising the safety of all members of the school community, especially the most vulnerable."

Table 3: Responses to Q18 /open ended questions

Theme (teacher/ union proposals)	Examples from responses	Implication for policy/advocacy
Strengthen physical security and infrastructure	Perimeter walls, fencing, controlled gates, CCTV, security guards, 24/7 police presence, relocation of schools from “red zones”	Governments and local authorities must resource basic protection measures for schools in high-risk areas.
Improve security sector performance and accountability	Faster police response to 117 calls, better equipment and fuel, end to bribery and brutality, community policing, “police scolaire”	Security forces need both capacity and oversight; unions can document failures and push for reforms.
Clear reporting mechanisms and faster follow-up	Hotlines, anonymous reporting, clear chain of communication, “whistleblowing policy,” immediate action rather than delay	Ministries and districts should institutionalise simple, safe reporting systems with guaranteed feedback.
Psychosocial support and mental health services	Guidance/counselling, school psychologists, trauma support for affected teachers and learners	PSS should be a core part of education in emergencies, not an add-on; unions can advocate this in bargaining.
Legal protection and labour justice for teachers	Stronger legal frameworks, enforcement of existing codes, legal assistance, compensation, ratification of C190, labour support	Teacher protection needs to be embedded in labour law and enforced, with unions resourced to support cases.

Table 3: Responses to Q18 /open ended questions

Theme (teacher/ union proposals)	Examples from responses	Implication for policy/advocacy
Community awareness and participation	Sensitisation of parents and communities, "community watch," churches/NGOs engagement, advocacy against extremism	Community-based protection is central; unions can ally with local actors for prevention and early warning.
Socio-economic improvements and teacher conditions	Risk allowances, salary increases, safer transport and lodging, posting teachers nearer home, banning boarding in very high-risk areas	Safety is inseparable from decent work and living conditions for teachers, especially in conflict zones.

Country Realities: KIIls revealed specific drivers: banditry and abductions in Nigeria, rebel occupation and forced recruitment in the DRC, and systemic repression in Cameroon.

• **Top 3 Cross-Cutting Priorities:**

1. Government Accountability: Moving from "lip service" to operationalising the SSD through clear command structures and funding.
2. Psychosocial Support (PSS): Addressing the universal trauma of students and the "silent" trauma of teachers.
3. Physical Infrastructure: Prioritising perimeter fencing and surveillance to deter intrusions and looting.

Thematic Deep Dive: Policy Advocacy and Legal Frameworks

A critical qualitative insight emerged regarding the gap between high-level policy endorsement and local-level safety.

- Operationalising the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD): While many governments have signed the SSD, respondents called for "effective implementation" and "operationalising" its guidelines. There is a specific demand for these commitments to be reflected in national budgets and local security protocols.
- AU Safe Schools Framework: Stakeholders frequently referenced the need to align national responses with the African Union (AU) Safe Schools Framework to ensure a standardised regional approach to protection.
- The "Double Victimisation" in Kenya: Data from Kenya highlighted a unique and distressing nuance: schools face attacks from students (student-led violence), but teachers subsequently face "intimidation from the government" or employers rather than support. This "double victimisation" underscores the need for unions to advocate for protection from both external and internal institutional threats.

Gender Dimensions and Targeted Violence

The analysis revealed that conflict-affected education settings are not gender-neutral. Multiple respondents (notably in Cameroon and Kenya) reported that girls and women are disproportionately impacted by school-related violence.

- Gender-Based Violence (GBV): Respondents linked school attacks to an increase in sexual violence and the specific targeting of female teachers for intimidation.
- Impact on Continuity: There is a documented "dropout increase (esp. girls)" following security incidents.
- Policy Response: Frontline workers in Cameroon specifically recommended the ratification of ILO Convention C190 to address violence and harassment in the workplace, alongside a call for "effective protection of the girl child."

Thematic Deep Dive: Training and Psychosocial Resilience

The human-centric dimension of safety was categorised into three priority areas:

1. Emergency Preparedness: Systematic training for teachers and ESP on

first aid, crisis management, and "lockdown procedures."

2. Psychosocial Support: A call for governments to hire dedicated school psychologists to address "signs of trauma/distress" among students and staff to prevent long-term psychological scarring.
3. Community Sensitisation: Utilizing "community watch committees" to foster local intelligence and collective responsibility for school safety.

Linguistic and Contextual Variations

The data showed subtle geographic shifts in the conceptualisation of "safety."

Context	Primary Focus Areas	Key Regional Mentions
English Responses	Focused on "policy enforcement," "perimeter walls," "incident reporting templates," and "risk allowances."	Nigeria, Kenya, South Sudan, South Africa, Ghana.
French/Portuguese Responses	Focused on "sensibilisation" (awareness), "protection des personnels," and "dispositif sécuritaire" (security systems).	Burundi, Cameroon, Senegal, Benin, DRC.

Contextual Note: In Nigeria and South Sudan, the focus remains heavily on military-style threats and SSD implementation, whereas in South Africa, the priorities lean toward protection from localized crime, looting of "technological learning devices," and substance-abuse-related violence.

5. Case Study Insights

5.1. Data Triangulation and Case Study Development

Quantitative trends were validated by qualitative depth to explain the "how" and "why" behind data points. For example, if cross-tabulations showed a spike in teacher displacement in rural Mali, KII data was used to identify the specific drivers and military dynamics responsible, but across other countries/regions with similar contexts.

Case Study Components: Online Group Discussions/KII's with 5 countries- Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Sudan.

The 5 country deep dives included:

- (1) Pattern of Attacks: Contextual analysis of killing, abductions, and school occupations.
- (3) Impact on community and region: School closures, student/teacher/household and community fear and trauma
- (4) Teachers as first responders: Specific contextual challenges for teachers
- (2) Union Response and Resilience: Documentation of good practices, community protection mechanisms, and member support programs.
- (3) SSD and Resolution 2601 Gaps: Identification of specific deviations from international protection commitments.

5.2. Three-Tiered Response Strategy



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Participants identified effective interventions at three distinct levels:

1. Community Level (Local Vigilance and Social Cohesion)

At the grassroots level, the focus is on organic protection mechanisms:

- **Vigilance Committees:** In Mozambique and Nigeria, the use of "Local Forces" or youth-led community watch groups (organised with sticks or basic tools) was cited as a successful deterrent to local banditry.
- **Social Cohesion Workshops:** In the DRC, community leaders use radio campaigns and workshops to build trust between different groups to prevent recruitment and internal conflict.
- **Safe Communication Lines:** Mechanisms like Mozambique's "Denúncias de Paz" allow isolated rural schools to report threats through organised community reporting chains.

2. Regional/National Level (Policy and Professional Support)

At this level, participants believe the focus should be on institutionalising protection:

- **Risk Allowances and Economic Security:** Teachers in conflict zones strongly advocate for hardship/risk allowances and salary increases, arguing that economic stability allows them to afford safer lodging and transportation.
- **Teacher-Led Emergency Training:** Training staff in first aid, fire drills, and crisis management empowers the school community to act proactively during an incident.
- **Relocation Strategies:** In Kenya and Nigeria, the strategic relocation of schools from rural "red zones" to more secure urban centres is viewed as an effective, though sometimes logistically difficult, protective measure.

3. Global Level (Advocacy and International Pressure)

From an advocacy lens, the global community is expected to provide normative and political leverage:

- **Diplomatic Pressure:** Participants in the DRC KII explicitly called for the international community to place pressure on state actors (like Rwanda) and rebel groups to engage in dialogue and respect schools as neutral zones.
- **Standardising Accountability:** There is a call for UNESCO and UNICEF to move beyond declarations and support the application of international law with punitive consequences for perpetrators of attacks on education.
- **Amplifying Union-Led Evidence:** A primary goal for participants is for Education International to use this "under-reported" teacher-centred data to inform global platforms like the UN Security Council and the African Union to close implementation gaps.

5.3. Country-specific responses

(per the online Group Discussions/KII's)

1. Nigeria: Banditry and the Scars of Abduction

- **Nature of Attacks:** Participants highlighted the shift from large-scale external attacks to localised banditry and extremist groups like Lakarawa and Boko Haram. Survey responses include references to abductions and, in a limited number of cases, killings, confirming that teachers operate in environments where extreme forms of violence are a real and present risk.

A primary focus was the abduction of 25 girls from Maga secondary school in Kebbi State, which occurred

Nigeria, attacks and impacts, by the numbers:

- Between **2009 and 2015**, attacks in northeastern Nigeria destroyed more than **910 schools** and forced at **least 1,500 schools** to close.
- At **least 611 teachers were deliberately killed** and **19,000 forced to flee** during that period.
- By 2024, UNICEF reported that more than **2,295 teachers had been killed, 19,000 displaced, and almost 1,400 schools destroyed across northeast Nigeria since 2009.**
- In early 2016, an estimated 952,029 school-age children had fled violence in the northeast.
- On 17 November 2025, gunmen attacked a girls' secondary school in Maga, Kebbi State, killing a staff

despite advance security warnings. The abduction of the girls from Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School, Maga, Kebbi State took place in the early hours of Monday 17 November 2025, around 04:00 local time (03:00 GMT). Gunmen described as “bandits” arrived on motorbikes around 04:00 and climbed the school fence to enter the compound.

They engaged police on duty in a gunfight, breached the perimeter, and went to the girls' dormitory, where they seized the students. A **teacher/vice principal was killed** during the attack and at least one other staff member was injured.³

- **Implementation Gaps:** A critical "order to withdraw" given to security personnel allowed the Maga abduction to happen, highlighting a massive failure in the security chain of command.
- **Systemic Impact:** The ripple effect of a single incident often leads to the closure of all schools in a state (e.g., Kebbi) as a precaution, causing massive disruption to exams and learning.

2. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Rebel Occupation and Recruitment

- **Nature of Attacks:**(as reported during the KII) Education is caught between multiple groups, including the M23/AFC, the Mobondo militia, and Kuluna gangs in Kinshasa. Incidents include the pillaging of school equipment (chairs, manuals, heating systems) and the use of schools for military purposes.

According to documented reports: **From March 2025 to February 2026**, armed groups **targeted at least 587 schools** in eastern DRC, up from 172 in the previous year (a three-fold increase)⁴

Around 330 schools were completely destroyed, and 191 were occupied by armed groups, leaving 321 schools closed and more than 122,000 children out of school in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. The education cluster estimates that about 1 million children in eastern DRC are currently out of school due to conflict-related closures⁵. The UN Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) country note for DRC reports that in a recent reporting period there were 193 verified incidents of attacks on schools and hospitals, and the military use of schools has disrupted education for more than 2.7 million children⁶.

³<https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/17/africa/gunmen-kidnap-schoolgirls-nigeria-intl>

⁴<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-number-attacks-schools-triples-one-year-violence-escalates>

⁵<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-number-attacks-schools-triples-one-year-violence-escalates>

⁶<https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2024/11/drc-thousands-of-children-face-escalating-violence-and-exploitation-amid-intensifying-conflict/>

DRC documented attacks on education and impact:

- From March 2025 to February 2026, armed groups targeted at least 587 schools in eastern DRC, up from 172 the previous year.
- Of these, 330 schools were destroyed, 191 occupied, and 321 remained closed, leaving more than 122,000 children out of school.
- Around 1.18 million children in eastern DRC are estimated to be out of education due to school closures.
- GCPEA documented more than 600 attacks on schools in 2020–2021 and at least 20 incidents targeting students, teachers, or other education personnel, including at least eight incidents involving killings or robberies of teachers or students.
- In 2024, violence in North Kivu forced 540 schools to close, leaving around 270,000 children out of education, with reported kidnappings of both teachers and students

Specific Vulnerabilities:

Participants reported the forced recruitment of students aged 15-18 as child soldiers. While killings were not explicitly detailed in the KII responses, both survey data and broader contextual evidence indicate that teachers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo operate in environments where extreme forms of violence, including killings, are a documented risk.

Protection Gaps: There is "no protection" in rebel-occupied areas, and schools in Kivu were forced to close at an alarming rate (e.g., 1,900 schools closed by early 2026).

3. Mozambique: Community Vigilance and Socio-Professional Risks

- **Nature of Attacks:** While the current situation in areas like Zambézia was described as relatively calm compared to the beginning of the year, schools remain vulnerable to vandalism and threats.

According to reports, In Cabo Delgado province, attacks by non-state armed groups have repeatedly targeted education since 2017. UN and government sources report that more than 220 schools have been attacked in the province and that, at various points, over 200 schools have remained closed in a single academic year, affecting more than 120,000 students and forcing displaced children into overcrowded or improvised learning spaces.

- **Local Responses:** The use of "Força Local" (Local Forces) and community vigilance committees is a primary protection strategy in rural areas.
- **Communication Gaps:** A major priority is the reinforcement of the "Denúncias de Paz" communication mechanism, particularly for isolated schools without phone access.

Case Study Box: Cabo Delgado, Mozambique

- Since 2017, more than 220 schools in Cabo Delgado have reportedly been attacked.
- In early 2021, 214 schools were non-operational and closed because of violent attacks.
- In **2021**, conflict affected **over 120,000 students**; at least **8 teachers were killed** and **2,074 teachers were affected/displaced**.
- In **2024**, **151 schools** remained closed, around **15% of all schools** in the province.
- In **2025**, provincial reporting still showed **105 schools closed**, and renewed attacks later affected **87 schools, 48,000 students**, and **490 teachers**.

4. South Sudan: Connectivity and Frontier Realities

- **Logistics of Advocacy:** The KII highlighted the extreme difficulty of maintaining union networks in rural states like Upper Nile (Malakal), where connectivity is poor and areas are only reachable by plane.
- **Teacher Targeting:** The discussion focused on the urgent need to understand why teachers and schools are being targeted specifically and how a lack of policy prevents effective intervention by the African Union or European Union.

5. Cameroon: Repression and the Anglophone Crisis

(Note: Context for Cameroon is also drawn from the detailed survey text provided in the sources)

- **Reporting Challenges:** In Cameroon, reporting mechanisms are often viewed as "inadequate and inconsistently enforced".
- **Political Constraints:** Some respondents described a "repressive system" where union leadership is fragilised, and standard professional grievances

are sometimes treated by the state as insurrection.

Drawing across all five countries, three major themes emerge that "contextualise and elaborate" the survey findings:

1. **The Accountability Gap:** Across Nigeria and the DRC, participants emphasised that security often "fails to arrive" or is "ordered to leave," necessitating a focus on government accountability.
2. **Psychosocial Distress:** "Trauma" was a universal keyword, with calls for Psychosocial Support (PSS) not just for students, but urgently for teachers who are expected to manage their students' trauma while experiencing their own.
3. **Union-Led Evidence:** Participants across all calls viewed these KIIs as a vital tool to "amplify teachers' voices" and provide the evidence needed to move from "lip service" to actual SSD implementation.

Based on the synthesis of the 358 survey responses and the five Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), there is a strong consensus on the critical actions needed to protect education in conflict-affected regions.

Top 3 Priorities for Urgent Attention

The following three priorities emerged most frequently across both the quantitative and qualitative data as the areas requiring the most immediate attention:

1. **Government Accountability and Political Will:** Participants across all focus countries emphasised that while policies like the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) exist, they are often mere "lip service". The top priority is moving from paper commitments to operational implementation, which includes holding security forces accountable for failures (such as the command failure in Nigeria) and ensuring dedicated funding for school safety.
2. **Comprehensive Psychosocial Support (PSS):** "Trauma" was identified as a universal keyword. Survey and KII participants prioritised the urgent need for mental health resources and counselling not only for students but specifically for teachers, who are often expected to manage their students' distress while suffering from their own professional and personal trauma.

3. **Enhanced Physical Security and Infrastructure:** There is a heavy demand for perimeter fencing, surveillance technology, and on-site security personnel. Survey respondents consistently ranked physical barriers as a top priority to deter abductions and looting, while KII participants in South Africa and Nigeria noted that without fences, schools are "unsafe to both wildlife and humans" or easily accessible to bandits.

6. Discussion and Analysis

The findings of this study reveal a consistent and deeply concerning pattern across Sub-Saharan Africa: attacks on teachers and schools are not isolated incidents, but part of a broader systemic failure to protect education in contexts of conflict, fragility, and insecurity.

6.1. A Systemic Gap Between Policy and Practice

Across all data sources, a clear disconnect emerges between the existence of international and regional protection frameworks and their implementation at the school level. While instruments such as the Safe Schools Declaration and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601 establish clear obligations for the protection of education, the data shows that these commitments are not consistently operationalised in practice.

Survey findings indicate that awareness of these frameworks is often limited to national or union leadership, with frontline teachers frequently reporting uncertainty or lack of knowledge. More critically, even where reporting mechanisms exist, they are often ineffective, with incidents rarely followed by meaningful institutional action. This “accountability gap” suggests that policy commitments remain largely symbolic unless supported by functional systems, resources, and political will.

This gap is further reinforced by qualitative insights, which highlight logistical barriers, fear of retaliation, and systemic distrust as key factors preventing effective reporting and response. In some contexts, reporting itself may expose teachers to additional risk, undermining the very mechanisms intended to protect them.

6.2 The Normalisation of Insecurity in Education Systems

A striking finding across both quantitative and qualitative data is the normalisation of insecurity within education environments. Teachers and students are not only exposed to extreme forms of violence—such as abductions and armed attacks—but also to persistent, lower-intensity threats, including intimidation, looting, and harassment.

These repeated exposures create an environment in which insecurity becomes embedded in the daily functioning of schools. As a result, the impact of attacks extends far beyond individual incidents, contributing to chronic disruption of education systems. School closures, teacher displacement, absenteeism, and increased dropout rates—particularly among girls—are not exceptional outcomes, but recurring consequences.

This aligns with broader evidence from Education International research, which demonstrates that in crisis contexts, instability in working conditions—including insecurity and lack of protection—contributes to teacher demotivation, attrition, and the gradual destabilisation of education systems.

6.3 Teachers as Frontline Responders Without Protection

The data highlights a critical paradox: teachers are expected to maintain educational continuity in crisis contexts, yet they are not adequately protected, supported, or resourced to do so.

In many cases, teachers act as first responders—providing psychosocial support, maintaining learning continuity, and supporting displaced or traumatised students—despite having limited training, resources, or institutional backing.

The "Silent Trauma" of Teachers: the findings demonstrate that teachers are expected to manage student trauma while suffering their own "silent trauma" without specialised support. At the same time, a significant proportion of respondents reported receiving no formal support following incidents, underscoring a major gap in recovery and protection systems.

This lack of support is not only a protection issue but also a workforce sustainability issue. As highlighted in EI research, inadequate support and compensation in crisis settings can lead to teacher attrition, deprofessionalisation, and long-term erosion of education systems.

6.4 Fragmented Approach to School Safety

The findings suggest that current responses to attacks on education are often fragmented, reactive, and narrowly focused—frequently prioritising physical security measures without addressing broader systemic needs.

However, global frameworks such as the Comprehensive School Safety Framework emphasise that effective protection requires a holistic, “all-hazards” and “whole-of-society” approach. This includes not only safer learning facilities, but also:

- Education continuity planning
- Risk reduction and resilience education
- Strong enabling systems and policies

The priorities identified by respondents—ranging from physical security to psychosocial support, training, and reporting systems—closely align with this comprehensive approach. This suggests that teachers and unions are already articulating solutions that reflect global best practice, even in the absence of systematic implementation.

6.5 The Central Role of Teacher Unions

A key cross-cutting finding is the central role played by teacher unions in contexts where state systems are weak or absent. In many cases, unions serve as:

- First responders in supporting affected teachers
- Primary channels for reporting incidents
- Advocates for protection, accountability, and policy implementation

This aligns with longstanding EI positions and resolutions, which emphasise the importance of involving teachers and their representative organisations in efforts to protect education and uphold the right to safe learning environments.

However, the data also highlights constraints faced by unions, including political pressure, limited resources, and restricted operational space in certain contexts. Strengthening the role and capacity of unions is therefore not only an advocacy priority, but a practical necessity for improving protection systems.

6.6 Unequal Impacts and Intersectional Vulnerabilities

The findings also underscore that attacks on education are not experienced equally. Gender, location, and context significantly shape vulnerability and impact.

Female teachers and students face heightened risks of gender-based violence, while rural and conflict-affected areas experience higher exposure to armed attacks and weaker institutional responses. Displaced populations, including those in refugee and IDP settings, face compounded vulnerabilities due to weakened infrastructure and limited access to services.

These patterns reinforce the need for protection strategies that are not only comprehensive, but also inclusive and context-sensitive, addressing the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups.

6.7 From Evidence to Action: A Turning Point

Taken together, the findings point to a critical conclusion: the challenge is no longer a lack of frameworks or knowledge, but a failure of implementation.

There is already a strong convergence between:

- International and regional frameworks (SSD, AU, CSSF)
- Evidence from teachers and unions
- Established good practices in education in emergencies

What is missing is the translation of this convergence into coordinated, adequately resourced, and accountable action at all levels.

This report, therefore, represents not only a documentation of the problem, but a call to shift from fragmented and reactive responses toward a systemic, teacher-centred approach to protecting education.

7. Implications for Policy, Protection, and Advocacy

Advocacy Integration and Policy Mapping

Findings were mapped directly against the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use to identify where governments are failing to meet SSD obligations.

Targeted Recommendations

- **National Governments:** Focused on strengthening legal protections, prosecuting SVAC and abductions, and operationalising SSD commitments.
- **Teacher Unions:** Focused on enhancing internal reporting, psychosocial member support, and data-driven advocacy.
- **International Partners:** Focused on funding protective measures and enforcing international norms via UN Security Council Resolution 2601 monitoring.

7.1. Actionable Recommendations for Stakeholders

The findings of this study point to an urgent need to move from policy commitments to operational, system-wide protection measures for teachers, education personnel, and learners. The evidence clearly demonstrates that while frameworks exist, their implementation remains inconsistent, under-resourced, and insufficiently accountable.

Addressing this gap requires coordinated action across multiple levels—national, regional, and global—with a central focus on teachers as both rights-holders and key actors in education system resilience.

Annex 4 provides a more technical, stakeholder-specific roadmap for the AU, RECs, and UN.” That avoids re-explaining the accountability gap again inside the main body

7.1.1. Strengthening Government Accountability and Implementation

Governments bear the primary responsibility for protecting education and ensuring safe learning environments. However, the data highlights critical shortcomings in translating commitments into practice.

To address this, governments should:

Operationalise existing frameworks

Translate commitments under the Safe Schools Declaration and United

- Nations Security Council Resolution 2601 into national legislation, policies, and budgeted action plans. For example, ensure that all reported incidents trigger timely and concrete follow-up actions, including investigation, formal documentation, referral to relevant authorities, and, where appropriate,

administrative or legal measures such as disciplinary action, arrest, or prosecution of perpetrators.

- Align national strategies with the principles of the Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience in the Education Sector Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF), including its three pillars: safer learning facilities, educational continuity, and risk reduction education

Strengthen reporting and accountability systems

- Establish accessible, confidential, and standardised reporting mechanisms for attacks on education
- Ensure that all reported incidents trigger timely investigation and follow-up action
- Disaggregate data by gender, location, and type of attack to inform targeted responses

Invest in school safety and protection systems

- Allocate dedicated budget lines for:
- Physical protection measures (e.g., fencing, controlled access)
- Emergency preparedness and response systems
- Safe transportation for teachers and students
- Integrate school safety into national education sector plans and emergency frameworks

Protect and support the teaching workforce

- Introduce risk and hardship allowances for teachers in high-risk areas
- Ensure access to psychosocial support, medical care, and legal protection following incidents
- Develop policies to prevent forced displacement and ensure safe redeployment where necessary

7.1.2. Empowering Teacher Unions as Protection Actors

Teacher unions play a critical role in protecting educators, documenting attacks, and advocating for systemic change. The findings confirm that unions often fill gaps left by state systems, particularly in crisis contexts.

To strengthen their impact, teacher unions should:

Enhance documentation and evidence generation

- Develop standardized tools for documenting attacks on teachers and schools
- Strengthen data collection systems to support evidence-based advocacy at national and international levels

Strengthen member protection and support systems

- Expand access to legal assistance, psychosocial support, and emergency response mechanisms for members
- Establish peer-support networks and referral systems for affected teachers

Promote awareness and capacity building

Raise awareness among members on:

Safe Schools Declaration commitments

- Reporting mechanisms and rights
- Provide training on:
 - Risk awareness and personal safety
 - Crisis response and educational continuity

Engage in social dialogue and policy advocacy

Advocate for the inclusion of teachers and unions in:

- National school safety planning
- Policy development and monitoring processes
- Strengthen engagement with ministries, regional bodies, and international partners

These actions are consistent with longstanding Education International positions, which emphasise the central role of teacher organisations in safeguarding education and ensuring accountability.

7.1.3. Advancing a Holistic Approach to School Safety

The findings clearly demonstrate that effective protection cannot rely solely on isolated or reactive measures. Instead, a comprehensive and integrated approach is required.

In line with the Comprehensive School Safety Framework, stakeholders should:

Adopt a “whole-of-system” approach

Integrate:

- Physical safety measures
- Psychosocial support systems
- Education continuity planning
- Risk reduction education
- Ensure preparedness and continuity
- Develop and implement school-level emergency preparedness plans
- Strengthen systems for remote or alternative learning modalities during disruptions
- Promote community-based protection mechanisms
- Support community engagement through:
 - School management committees
 - Local vigilance or protection groups

Strengthen trust and coordination between schools, communities, and local authorities

7.1.4. Prioritising Psychosocial Support and Teacher Wellbeing

The study highlights the significant psychosocial impact of attacks on teachers and students, which remains largely under-addressed.

To respond effectively:

- Integrate mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) into education systems
- Recruit and deploy trained personnel, including school counsellors where possible

Provide training for teachers to:

Identify signs of trauma

- Offer basic psychosocial support
- Ensure long-term support systems rather than one-off interventions

Supporting teacher wellbeing is essential not only for individual recovery, but for maintaining the functionality and resilience of education systems.

7.1.5. Strengthening the Role of International and Regional Actors

International organisations, donors, and regional actors—including the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—play a critical role in supporting governments and strengthening accountability for the protection of education. This includes working through AU-led frameworks and supporting coordination and policy alignment at regional level through RECs such as ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD.

They should:

- Align funding with protection priorities

Increase investment in:

- School safety infrastructure
- Psychosocial support systems
- Teacher protection and support mechanisms

Support monitoring and accountability

Strengthen mechanisms to monitor compliance with:

- Safe Schools Declaration
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601
- Support independent data collection and verification systems

Promote regional coordination and policy alignment

Work with the African Union and regional bodies to:

- Harmonise approaches to protecting education
- Share good practices and lessons learned
- Support teacher-centred approaches


Ensure that teachers and their unions are systematically included in:

- Program design
- Policy dialogue

- Monitoring and evaluation processes

7.1.6 Regional and Global Accountability: AU, RECs, and the United Nations

Despite widespread endorsement of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601, a critical accountability gap persists between high-level commitments and the lived realities of frontline teachers. Addressing this gap requires stronger coordination, enforcement, and accountability mechanisms at regional and global levels. The African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the United Nations (UN) each have a critical role to play in translating commitments into concrete protection outcomes.



Policy recommendations for AU, RECs, and UN to operationalise protection of education:

- African Union (AU):
 - Champion the implementation of the AU Safe Schools Framework and align it with the SSD.
 - Require regular member-state reporting on attacks and response actions.

- Elevate teacher/school protection within the AU peace and security agendas.
- Ensure teacher unions are represented in continental policy monitoring.
- **Regional Economic Communities (RECs):**
 - Harmonise regional standards for protecting education in conflict.
 - Support cross-border early warning and information-sharing.
 - Convene member states to share SSD implementation "good practices."
- **United Nations (UN):**
 - Use UNSCR 2601 more actively for monitoring and raising attacks in country/global processes.
 - Strengthen support for independent documentation and public reporting.
 - Fund implementation, focusing on psychosocial support (PSS) and teacher protection, not just policy adoption.
 - Ensure teacher-centred evidence informs the CAAC (Children and Armed Conflict)

*Note: In this context, “policy, education, and humanitarian decision-making” refers to coordinated decision-making processes across national, regional, and global levels

These recommendations reinforce the need for coordinated action across levels, ensuring that monitoring, financing, and accountability mechanisms are aligned to protect teachers and schools effectively.

7.1.7. A Call for Systemic and Sustained Action

The evidence presented in this report makes clear that protecting teachers and schools requires more than isolated interventions—it requires sustained political commitment, coordinated action, and adequate resourcing.

Teachers are not only victims of attacks; they are central actors in maintaining education systems in the most challenging contexts. Protecting them is therefore not only a matter of rights, but a prerequisite for ensuring access to safe, continuous, and quality education.

The time for symbolic commitments has passed. What is now required is decisive, system-wide action to ensure that schools are truly safe spaces for learning, and that teachers are protected, supported, and empowered to fulfil their essential role.

Achieving these actions is essential not only for protecting education systems, but also for advancing global commitments such as SDG4 on inclusive and equitable quality education.

8. Conclusion: From Symbolic Policy to Active Protection

The collective voice of the 358 survey respondents, together with insights from the five country case studies, sends a clear and urgent message: attacks on teachers and schools across Africa are not isolated events, but part of a broader pattern of insecurity, weak protection systems, and uneven implementation of existing commitments. (see consolidated list of recommendations in Annex 4)

This report shows that the central challenge is not the absence of frameworks. The Safe Schools Declaration, the African Union Safe Schools Framework, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2601, and related guidance already provide a strong normative foundation. The real gap lies in implementation: too often, commitments made at international, regional and national levels do not translate into practical protection, accountability, and support at the level of the school.

The evidence also highlights that attacks on education are not only a security issue. They are a professional, psychosocial, gender, and systems issue. They disrupt learning, deepen fear, fuel teacher attrition, increase the vulnerability of girls and marginalised learners, and weaken already fragile education systems. Teachers are expected to keep schools functioning, support traumatised learners, and hold communities together, yet many do so without adequate protection, recognition, or support.

At the same time, the findings point toward a practical way forward. Respondents across countries consistently called for stronger accountability, better reporting and response mechanisms, psychosocial support, safer infrastructure, and greater investment in teacher protection and preparedness. They also underscored the indispensable role of teacher unions as protection actors, advocates, and channels for evidence-based action.

Beyond documenting patterns of violence, the findings of this report point to underlying reasons why teachers and schools are targeted. In many contexts, schools represent state presence, social norms, and access to information, making them strategic targets for armed groups, political actors, or other forms of organised violence. Teachers, as authority figures and community leaders, may also be targeted for their role in shaping knowledge, values, and social cohesion.

Attacks on teachers and education therefore extend beyond individual acts of violence. They undermine access to education, disrupt the quality and continuity

of learning, and erode the teaching profession by creating conditions of fear, instability, and attrition. As such, attacks on education represent not only a protection issue, but a systemic threat to education systems and broader social stability.

Protecting teachers and schools therefore requires more than rhetorical commitment. It requires coordinated, adequately funded, and sustained action by governments, regional bodies, international partners, and communities. Schools must be treated as protected spaces of learning and recovery, and teachers must be recognised not only as education workers, but as essential frontline actors in resilience, continuity, and peace.

The message of this report is ultimately both urgent and constructive: the evidence is clear, the frameworks exist, and the priorities are known. What is needed now is the political will to act decisively, systematically, and with teachers and their unions at the centre.

Annexes

Annex 1: Countries with high incident levels + known teacher union presence

Below is a summary of what existing evidence suggests about which Sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing high rates of armed attacks on schools and teachers and also have recognised teacher unions/associations (especially those affiliated with EI or visible in union networks). Below are some countries that stand out in reports, with notes on union presence, gaps, and trade-offs.

Table 1: Countries with high incident levels + known teacher union presence


Country	CountryEvidence of Attacks on Schools / Teachers	Union/Association Presence	Pros / Cons for Selection
Nigeria	-Save the Children found most incidents in 2023 in Nigeria (89) among AU countries. Save the Children International+1-GCPEA and HRW document many cases of killing, abduction, displacement of teachers in northeast (Boko Haram etc.).- Teacher displacement and deaths; schools burned/ abandoned.	- Nigeria Union of Teachers (NUT) is a large, recognized union. home. nut-ng.org- Active union involvement in conflict zones (e.g. Borno) in supporting displaced teachers etc. Solidarity Centre	High relevance; union partner strong; but large and diverse, security issues especially in conflict-zones.
Burkina Faso	Sharp increase in attacks: over 270 attacks on schools in 2022-2023; many destroyed or damaged, many schools closed. Human Rights Watch+3Human Rights Watch+3allAfrica.com+3-Armed Islamist groups targeting teachers, abductions, threats etc. Human Rights Watch+1	- Teacher unions are members of Education International Africa. F-SYNTER, SNEAB, SNESS, and SYNATEB.	Very relevant; somewhat smaller infrastructure; but high risk, access and security issues.

Table 1: Countries with high incident levels + known teacher union presence


Country	CountryEvidence of Attacks on Schools / Teachers	Union/Association Presence	Pros / Cons for Selection
Mali	- In the Central Sahel region, many attacks, school closures, military use of schools. NORRAG-+3Human Rights Watch+3 UNICEF+3- Violence affecting teachers and students especially in troubled north.	- Recognised unions (SNEC-UNTM) among EI Africa affiliates. Education International- Unions strike over pay and conditions. wavn.org+1	Strong case; but similarly access/ security constraints; need local partner cooperation.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	-High number of attacks, both on infrastructure and personnel. GCPEA lists DRC among most affected. right-to-education.org+1- Schools used for military purposes; displacement; conflict across multiple provinces.	Unions affiliated with EI: CSC-Enseignement, FENECO-UNTC, SYECO etc. Education International+1	Large country; varying conflict zones; issues of logistics; but union network present and potentially strong case studies.
South Sudan	-Among top countries in terms of attacks on education, high harm to teachers/students. GCPEA reports over 1,000 attacks in earlier periods. ukfiet.org+1- Conflict leading to school occupation, teacher displacement etc	-National Teachers Union of South Sudan (NTUSS) is an affiliate of EI	

Annex 2: Survey Responses (Diagrams) of 358 respondents


Q1. Consent Do you consent to participate in this survey? (Required) Consentez-vous à participer à cette enquête ? (Obligatoire) Você consente em participar desta pesquisa (Obrigatório)
348 responses




Q2. Role / Fonction / Função (Select one/ Selectionnez-en un/ Sélecione um)
348 responses




Q3. Gender / Genre / Gênero
348 responses



Q4.Age band / Tranche d'âge / Faixa etária
348 responses




(created by AI- NotebookLM)



Q7. Location / Lieu / Local


348 responses



Q8. Education Institution Type / Type d'institution éducative / Tipo de instituição de ensino


(Select all that apply/ sélectionnez tout ce qui s'applique selecione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses




Q9. Disability status (respondent) / Handicap (répondant -e) / Deficiência (respondente)

348 responses




Q10. Learners with disabilities in your class/school? / Élèves en situation de handicap ? / Alunos com deficiência?

348 responses




Q11. Incidents experienced or witnessed / Incident vécus ou observés / Incidentes vivenciados ou testemunhados (Select all that apply/ sélectionnez... ce qui s'applique/seleccione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses




Q12. Frequency at your school/educational institution/community EN: How often have these occurred, per year? FR: Fréquence dans votre école... na sua escola/instituição/comunidade, por ano

348 responses




Q13. Immediate impacts observed / Impacts immédiats observés / Impactos inmediatos observados
(Select all that apply / sélectionnez tout ce qui s'applique/ seleccione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses




Q14. Protection measures currently in place / Mesures de protection actuellement en place / Medidas de proteção atualmente em vigor (Select all...ce qui s'applique/ seleccione tudo o que se aplica)

348 responses



Q15. Awareness of policies/frameworks / Connaissance des politiques, cadres / Conscientização sobre políticas/estruturas (Type: Multiple-choice grid: columns = Yes / No / Not sure)




Q16. Reporting attacks / Signalement des attaques / Relatando ataques (a) Do you have a way to report attacks or threats / Avez-vous un mécanisme de signalement ? Você tem como reportar incidentes?
348 responses




Q16. Reporting attacks / Signalement des attaques / Relatando ataques (b) (Do you have a specific policy or process for reporting? / Avez-vous une politique ou processus spécifique?
348 responses




Q16. Reporting attacks / Signalement des attaques / Relatando ataques © (Respond N/A if response is No for Q16 (a) Répondez S/O si la réponse est Non à la question (a) / A quem você se reporta?
348 responses



Q16. Reporting attacks / Signalement des attaques / Relatando ataques (d) (Respond N/A if response is NO for Q16 (a) Répondez S/O si la répo...’effet ? Os relatórios geralmente são atendidos?
348 responses



Q17. Support received after incidents / Soutien reçu après des incidents / Apoio recebido após incidentes (Select all that apply/ sélectionnez tout ce qui s’applique/ selecione tudo o que se aplica)
348 responses



Annex 3: KII Questionnaire Form (English)

Individual or Group Interview (KII)

Study: Protection of Teachers, ESP and Students from Attacks on Schools

Country: _____ Date: _____

1. Introduction & Consent

Please respond verbally or by ticking the box:

- Do you agree to participate in this interview?

Yes ☐ No ☐

- Do you authorize audio recording (only to facilitate note-taking)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

- Do you prefer to remain anonymous in the final report?

Yes ☐ No ☐

- Do you understand that participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time?

Yes ☐ No ☐

2. Participant Information

- Name (optional): _____
- Position/Role: _____
- Region/State/Province: _____
- Type of Institution: _____
- Years of Experience: _____
- Gender (optional): _____
- Union Affiliation (if any): _____
- Would you like to be identified in the report?

Yes ☐ No ☐

3. Current Context

How would you describe the current situation in your context (political, social, etc.) related to school safety?

4. Incidents & Risks

- Have you experienced or witnessed attacks or threats in the education environment?

Yes ☐

No ☐

- If yes, what types of incidents occurred? (e.g., threats, assaults, looting, military use of schools, abductions, etc.)

- How frequently do these incidents occur?
- Who were the main perpetrators?

5. Impacts

- What immediate impacts followed these incidents?
- Which groups were most affected?
(e.g. teachers, education support personnel, girls, students with disabilities, etc.)

- Did the incidents lead to school closures, displacement, trauma or school dropout?

Yes ☐ No ☐ If yes, please explain: _____

6. Protection Measures

- What protection measures currently exist in your school/community?

- Which measures are effective? Which are ineffective?

- Which government or community measures have been helpful?

7. Reporting Mechanisms

- Is there a way to report attacks or threats?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure ☐

- To whom are reports made? (Tick all that apply)

Union ☐ Ministry of Education ☐ Police/Authorities ☐

NGO/UN ☐ School Administration ☐ Other ☐ Which? _____

- Are reports acted upon?

Always ☐ Frequently ☐ Sometimes ☐ Rarely ☐ Never ☐ Don't know ☐

- What challenges are faced in reporting?

8. Support Received

- What type of support was provided after incidents? (Select all that apply)

Psychosocial support ☐ Medical care ☐ Legal assistance ☐ NONE

Relocation/transfer ☐ Replacement of materials/equipment ☐

Salary/compensation continuity ☐ Other: _____

Sexual violence, death, violence,

But too expensive to get support

- What additional support is needed to improve safety?

9. Priority Actions

- Which 1 to 3 actions would most improve safety for teachers, ESP and students in your context?
- Why are these actions priorities?

- Which actors should implement these actions?

10. Additional Information

- What reporting policies/processes are used?

- Are there any marginalized groups particularly affected?

- Other useful comments or recommendations?

Annex 4: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STAKEHOLDERS

1. Strategic Context and the Mandate for Union Inclusion

This Annex serves as a technical roadmap to bridge the systemic gap between "symbolic policy" and "active protection" for education in conflict-affected regions. As one survey respondent noted with urgency, "Security organs are only a few kilometres away, yet we remain exposed," highlighting an accountability gap that can only be closed through the systematic inclusion of teacher unions in programme design, policy dialogue, and monitoring. These recommendations recognise teacher unions as primary "first responders" and technical experts whose engagement is non-negotiable for the successful operationalisation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) and the Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF).

2. Consolidated Recommendations Table: AU, RECs, and UN

Stakeholder Group	Policy/Action Category	Strategic Recommendation	Implementation Objective (Source-Grouted)
African Union (AU) & Regional Economic Communities (RECs)	Policy Harmonisation	Align national education sector plans and security strategies with the AU Safe Schools Framework and the CSSF.	Establish cross-border "neutrality protocols" that prevent the military use of schools by state and non-state actors.
African Union (AU) & Regional Economic Communities (RECs)	Regional Coordination	Standardise community-led "early action" communication chains across RECs (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD).	Scale successful resilience models, such as Mozambique's Denúncias de Paz, to ensure isolated schools have functional threat-reporting links to regional security hubs.

2. Consolidated Recommendations Table: AU, RECs, and UN

Stakeholder Group	Policy/Action Category	Strategic Recommendation	Implementation Objective (Source-Grouted)
African Union (AU) & Regional Economic Communities (RECs)	Monitoring & Accountability	Strengthen regional mechanisms to monitor state compliance with the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD).	Institutionalise command-and-control accountability to prevent security failures and "orders to withdraw" that leave schools vulnerable to mass abductions.
United Nations (UN) & International Partners	Normative Enforcement	Utilise UN Security Council Resolution 2601 to enforce international law with punitive consequences for perpetrators.	Trigger institutional and legal responses for violations including abductions and Sexual Violence Related to Conflict (SVAC) to end the cycle of impunity.
United Nations (UN) & International Partners	Funding Alignment	Increase and align donor funding with teacher-identified priorities: physical infrastructure, MHPSS, and teacher documentation.	Ensure the direct allocation of risk and hardship allowances for frontline educators to prevent attrition and sustain the workforce in high-threat "red zones."

2. Consolidated Recommendations Table: AU, RECs, and UN

Stakeholder Group	Policy/Action Category	Strategic Recommendation	Implementation Objective (Source-Grounded)
United Nations (UN) & International Partners	Data & Evidence	Utilise union-led evidence to inform global monitoring platforms managed by UNESCO and UNICEF.	Close the "data gap" by documenting under-reported metrics, specifically the military use of schools and the forced recruitment of child soldiers.
Cross-Cutting (Regional & Global)	Teacher Union Empowerment	Institutionalise the role of teacher unions as rights-holders and technical experts in all safety planning.	Empower unions to fill state service gaps by providing member-led documentation of attacks and professional support for affected personnel.
Cross-Cutting (Regional & Global)	Holistic School Safety	Support a "whole-of-system" approach from the Comprehensive School Safety Framework (CSSF).	Integrate physical protection, educational continuity, and risk reduction into a unified resilience strategy rather than fragmented, reactive measures.

3. Implementation Pillars

The following four pillars represent the essential components for a systemic response to attacks on education, as identified by 358 survey respondents and regional case studies:

- **Pillar 1: Physical Security & Hardening:** Stakeholders must prioritise defining school boundaries as "protected zones" to eliminate the porosity mentioned by 48% of respondents. This includes the installation of mandatory perimeter fencing, 24-hour guards (gendarmerie/police), and surveillance technology to deter abductions, looting, and unauthorised entry.
- **Pillar 2: Systemic Accountability:** Efforts must focus on closing the "accountability gap" by ensuring that reporting mechanisms—including those for SVAC and child recruitment—trigger timely investigations and legal action. Accountability must reach the highest levels of the security chain to prevent the failure of protection protocols during active threats.
- **Pillar 3: Teacher Wellbeing & Psychosocial Support (PSS):** Addressing the "silent trauma" of educators is a critical workforce sustainability issue. The deployment of trained counsellors and psychologists is necessary to prevent teacher attrition and deprofessionalisation caused by the normalisation of insecurity and chronic exposure to violence.
- **Pillar 4: Capacity Building & Social Cohesion:** Investment must be directed toward teacher-led emergency response training (lockdown procedures, first aid) and community sensitisation workshops. These measures build social cohesion and collective responsibility, utilising local intelligence to create early-warning systems that protect the entire school community.

The Four Implementation Pillars for School Safety


Bridging the accountability gap between policy and the reality of frontline teachers through resourced action and integrated protection.

Pillar 1: Physical Security & Hardening



Schools as 'Protected Zones'


Eliminate porosity by establishing clear, defended boundaries to deter abductions and looting.



24-Hour Active Protection

Deploy permanent guards (police/gendarmerie) and mandatory perimeter fencing with surveillance technology.

Pillar 2: Systemic Accountability



High-Level Responsibility

Hold the highest levels of the security chain responsible for failures in protection protocols.



Closing the Accountability Gap

Ensure that reporting of school-based violence triggers immediate institutional investigation and legal action.



Reporting for SVAC and Recruitment


Establish safe, functional mechanisms to specifically report sexual violence and child soldier recruitment.

Pillar 3: Teacher Wellbeing & Psychosocial Support (PSS)



Specialist Deployment

Recruit and deploy trained counselors and psychologists directly to conflict-affected school districts.



Addressing 'Silent Trauma'

Provide mental health resources for educators managing their own trauma while supporting distressed students.



Workforce Sustainability

Prioritize wellbeing to prevent teacher attrition and the depersonalization of the education sector.

Pillar 4: Capacity Building & Social Cohesion



Early-Warning Systems

Utilize local intelligence and community sensitization workshops to identify and report threats early.



Teacher-Led Response Training

Invest in systematic training for lockdown procedures, crisis management, and emergency first aid.



Collective Responsibility

Foster social cohesion between schools, parents, and local authorities to create shared protection chains.

NotebookLM



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